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Single Idea 13742

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts ]

Full Idea

I am happy to accept universal composition, on the grounds that there are heaps, piles etc with no integral unity, and that arbitrary composites are no less unified than heaps.

Gist of Idea

There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way

Source

Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1 n11)

Book Ref

'Metametaphysics', ed/tr. Chalmers/Manley/Wasserman [OUP 2009], p.358

A Reaction

The metaphysical focus is then placed on what constitutes 'integral unity', which is precisely the question which most interested Aristotle. Clearly if there is nothing more to an entity than its components, scattering them isn't destruction.

The 45 ideas with the same theme [the idea of summed parts as a single entity]:

13259 It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
15843 The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato]
15844 A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato]
13260 Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki]
12878 Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter [Aristotle, by Simons]
16136 A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants [Aristotle]
9071 We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it [Aristotle]
16791 There is no whole except for the parts [Aristotle]
22525 The whole is prior to its parts, because parts are defined by their role [Aristotle]
13269 In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle]
20825 How is divisibility possible, if stoics say things remain united when they are divided? [Alexander on Stoic school]
20826 How is separateness possible, if separated things are always said to be united? [Alexander on Stoic school]
20872 Stoics say wholes are more than parts, but entirely consist of parts [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
22744 Parts are not parts if their whole is nothing more than the parts [Sext.Empiricus]
10919 What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
17244 To make a whole, parts needn't be put together, but can be united in the mind [Hobbes]
12887 A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
15474 Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB]
11844 If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins]
10810 I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis]
9667 Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis]
13268 There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider]
10566 Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Lewis, by Fine,K]
14244 Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley on Lewis]
10660 A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it [Lewis]
15440 A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
15444 Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
17557 Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen]
13328 Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
18514 Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts [Heil]
18517 Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line [Heil]
6154 It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands]
10658 Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
12888 The wholeness of a melody seems conventional, but of an explosion it seems natural [Simons]
13742 There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
13752 The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
6956 At what point does an object become 'whole'? [Westaway]
14949 A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross]
10665 Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack]
10682 The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack]
15392 If an object survives the loss of a part, complex objects can have autonomy over their parts [Robb]
13266 Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki]
14500 Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki]
13281 Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki]
18434 That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards]