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Single Idea 15319

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff ]

Full Idea

There is no metaphysical justification whatever for treating the solid, bounded, material object as the determiner of all thing concepts. Fluids are no less material things than are hard solid blocks.

Gist of Idea

Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things

Source

Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.IV)

Book Ref

Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.180


A Reaction

We don't tend to talk of a fluid as 'a' thing, and without distinct objects there would be virtually no structure, or interest, in nature, so what gives identity to the blocks must interest the metaphysician.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [general masses which are fairly homogeneous]:

A composite is a true unity if all of its parts fall under one essence [Scheibler]
Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden]
We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis]
Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis]
I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen]
Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA]
If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien]
Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD]
Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider]
Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons]
Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons]
Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons]
The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki]