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Single Idea 6472

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff ]

Full Idea

Continuity is not a sufficient criterion of material identity; it is sufficient in many cases, such as rocks and tables, where the appearances change slowly, but in others, such as the parts of an approximately homogeneous fluid, it fails us utterly.

Clarification

A 'homogeneous' has the same texture throughout, such as water

Gist of Idea

Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid

Source

Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Mysticism and Logic' [Unwin 1989], p.164

A Reaction

It might be debatable to what extent the 'parts' of a homogeneous fluid have identity. How many 'parts' are there in a glass of water? This seems, now, a problem for internalists; externalists can define the identity by the unseen molecules.

The 18 ideas from 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics'

6483 Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H]
8244 Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
6459 We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell]
6458 Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]
6460 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell]
6461 Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell]
6462 Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell]
6463 Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell]
6464 Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell]
6470 Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell]
6465 We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
6466 Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell]
6467 No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell]
6468 There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell]
6469 Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]
6471 The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
6472 Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
6473 Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell]