more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 19694
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
]
Full Idea
Zagzebski takes wisdom as literally properties of persons, not persons' cognitive states.
Gist of Idea
Wisdom is the property of a person, not of their cognitive state
Source
report of Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], p.59-60) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom 'Twofold'
Book Ref
'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.100
A Reaction
Not sure about this. Zagzebski uses this idea to endorse epistemic virtue. But knowledge and ignorance are properties of persons too. There can be, though, a precise mental state involved in knowledge, but not in wisdom.
The
34 ideas
from 'Virtues of the Mind'
|
20186
|
Unlike knowledge, wisdom cannot be misused
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20187
|
Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20188
|
Modern epistemology is too atomistic, and neglects understanding
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20191
|
Some beliefs are fairly voluntary, and others are not at all so
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20193
|
Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20194
|
Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20196
|
Virtue theory is hopeless if there is no core of agreed universal virtues
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20199
|
Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20197
|
The courage of an evil person is still a quality worth having
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20200
|
A virtue must always have a corresponding vice
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20201
|
Eight marks distingush skills from virtues
[Zagzebski, by PG]
|
|
20202
|
Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20203
|
Virtues are deep acquired excellences of persons, which successfully attain desire ends
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20207
|
Every moral virtue requires a degree of intelligence
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20205
|
The feeling accompanying curiosity is neither pleasant nor painful
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20206
|
Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples)
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20208
|
We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20209
|
For the virtue of honesty you must be careful with the truth, and not just speak truly
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20210
|
A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20213
|
We need phronesis to coordinate our virtues
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20214
|
Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20215
|
A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20216
|
Modern moral theory concerns settling conflicts, rather than human fulfilment
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20218
|
The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20217
|
Truth is valuable, but someone knowing the truth is more valuable
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20222
|
Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20220
|
Objection by counterexample is weak, because it only reveals inaccuracies in one theory
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20221
|
Precision is only one of the virtues of a good definition
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20223
|
Epistemology is excessively atomic, by focusing on justification instead of understanding
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20225
|
For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20226
|
Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20228
|
We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth
[Zagzebski]
|
|
20227
|
Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck
[Zagzebski]
|
|
19694
|
Wisdom is the property of a person, not of their cognitive state
[Zagzebski, by Whitcomb]
|