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Single Idea 13120
[filed under theme 7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
]
Full Idea
Chisholm's Ontological Categories: ENTIA - {Contingent - [Individual - (Boundaries)(Substances)] [States - (Events)]} {Necessary - [States] [Non-States - (Attributes)(Substance)]}
Gist of Idea
Chisholm divides things into contingent and necessary, and then individuals, states and non-states
Source
report of Roderick Chisholm (A Realistic Theory of Categories [1996], p.3) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §01
Book Ref
Westerhoff,Jan: 'Ontological Categories' [OUP 2005], p.14
A Reaction
[I am attempting a textual representation of a tree diagram! The bracket-styles indicate the levels.]
The
45 ideas
from Roderick Chisholm
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9268
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If free will miraculously interrupts causation, animals might do that; why would we want to do it?
[Frankfurt on Chisholm]
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3442
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Responsibility seems to conflict with events being either caused or not caused
[Chisholm]
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3443
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Desires may rule us, but are we responsible for our desires?
[Chisholm]
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3444
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If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person
[Chisholm]
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3445
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Causation among objects relates either events or states
[Chisholm]
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3446
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For Hobbes (but not for Kant) a person's actions can be deduced from their desires and beliefs
[Chisholm]
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20062
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If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong
[Chisholm]
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20054
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There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent
[Chisholm]
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11965
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Could possible Adam gradually transform into Noah, and vice versa?
[Chisholm]
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11966
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If there are essential properties, how do you find out what they are?
[Chisholm]
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8790
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The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying
[Chisholm]
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15801
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Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves
[Chisholm]
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15802
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I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout
[Chisholm]
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15803
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Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process
[Chisholm]
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15806
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The property of being identical with me is an individual concept
[Chisholm]
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15809
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A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property
[Chisholm]
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15804
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If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine'
[Chisholm]
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15808
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A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics
[Chisholm]
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15805
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Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity
[Chisholm]
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15807
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A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity
[Chisholm]
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15810
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Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves
[Chisholm]
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15813
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People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence
[Chisholm]
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15811
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I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself'
[Chisholm]
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15814
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A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities
[Chisholm]
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15815
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Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent'
[Chisholm]
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15819
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Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter?
[Chisholm]
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15816
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'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book'
[Chisholm]
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15817
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If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'?
[Chisholm]
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15818
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So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them
[Chisholm]
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15821
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Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition
[Chisholm]
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15820
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A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary
[Chisholm]
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15822
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The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature
[Chisholm]
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15823
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Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation'
[Chisholm]
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15824
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There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission'
[Chisholm]
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15826
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There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ
[Chisholm]
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15827
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Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had'
[Chisholm]
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15828
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I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs
[Chisholm]
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15829
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The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted
[Chisholm]
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15830
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Some properties can never be had, like being a round square
[Chisholm]
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15831
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Explanations have states of affairs as their objects
[Chisholm]
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15832
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Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times
[Chisholm]
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12852
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If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists
[Chisholm, by Simons]
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12851
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Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks
[Chisholm, by Simons]
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13120
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Chisholm divides things into contingent and necessary, and then individuals, states and non-states
[Chisholm, by Westerhoff]
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19569
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We have a basic epistemic duty to believe truth and avoid error
[Chisholm, by Kvanvig]
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