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Single Idea 14067

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay ]

Full Idea

The piece of clay and the statue are 'objects' - that is to say, they can be designated with proper names, and the logic we ordinarily use will still apply.

Gist of Idea

Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about

Source

Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], I)

Book Ref

-: 'Journal of Symbolic Logic' [-], p.190

A Reaction

An interesting indication of the way that 'object' is used in modern analytic philosophy, which may not be the way that it is used in ordinary English. The number 'seven', for example, seems to be an object by this criterion.

The 14 ideas from Allan Gibbard

14064 If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
14066 A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
14067 Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
14065 Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
14070 A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
14069 We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
14071 Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
14072 Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
14073 Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
14074 Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
14076 Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
14077 Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
14078 Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
14079 Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]