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Single Idea 6137

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay ]

Full Idea

A statue is not identical with its constituent lump of clay because they have different persistence conditions; the statue, but not the lump, could survive the loss of a few smallish bits, and the lump, but not the statue, could survive being squashed.

Gist of Idea

Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing)

Source

Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §2.III)

Book Ref

Merricks,Trenton: 'Objects and Persons' [OUP 2003], p.38

A Reaction

I don't see why a lump can't survive losing a few bits (if the lump never had a precise identity), but it is hard to argue that squashing is a problem. However, presumably the identity (or constitution) between lump and statue is not a necessity.

The 73 ideas from Trenton Merricks

17960 Eternalism says all times are equally real, and future and past objects and properties are real [Merricks]
17961 Growing block has a subjective present and a growing edge - but these could come apart [Merricks, by PG]
14229 Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics [Merricks, by Liggins]
6123 Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour [Merricks]
6124 I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist [Merricks]
6130 'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object [Merricks]
6125 We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples [Merricks]
6128 Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region [Merricks]
6127 'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing [Merricks]
6131 Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things [Merricks]
6132 Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts [Merricks]
6133 If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy [Merricks]
6134 Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts? [Merricks]
6136 Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox [Merricks]
6135 A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent [Merricks]
6137 Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing) [Merricks]
6138 It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located [Merricks]
6140 Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons [Merricks]
6141 There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise [Merricks]
6143 Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time [Merricks]
6142 The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways [Merricks]
6144 You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software [Merricks]
6145 Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists [Merricks]
6147 The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties [Merricks]
6146 Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties [Merricks]
6148 Human organisms can exercise downward causation [Merricks]
6149 Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice [Merricks]
6150 The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge [Merricks]
14472 If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it [Merricks, by Thomasson]
14469 Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage [Merricks]
19200 Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks]
19202 Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks]
19201 Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks]
19203 A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks]
19204 True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks]
19205 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks]
19207 Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks]
19206 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks]
19208 The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks]
19209 Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks]
19210 The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks]
19211 Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks]
19212 Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks]
19213 We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks]
19214 In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks]
19217 I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks]
19215 Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks]
14390 Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks]
14391 If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks]
14392 Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]
14393 The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks]
14395 If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks]
14394 It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks]
14396 If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks]
14397 Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks]
14398 Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks]
14400 If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks]
14402 If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks]
14403 If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks]
14406 Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks]
14407 Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks]
14405 How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks]
14408 Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
14410 You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks]
14411 Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks]
14412 Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
14414 I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
14413 Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks]
14415 A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks]
14416 An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks]
14417 Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks]
14418 Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks]
14419 Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks]