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Single Idea 16955

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species ]

Full Idea

Kripke stresses that membership of a single animal species requires identity or similarity of internal structure. In my view, what matters is genetic affinity - a common descent. Internal structure is merely a clue.

Gist of Idea

Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent

Source

report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Michael Dummett - Could There Be Unicorns? 2

Book Ref

Dummett,Michael: 'The Seas of Language' [OUP 1993], p.332

A Reaction

The crucial test question would be whether we can make a tiger artificially (even constructing the DNA). I would say that if you make a tiger, that's a tiger, so Kripke is right and Dummett is wrong. The species is what it is, not where it came from.

The 18 ideas with the same theme [essence for animals is the species they belong to]:

16106 Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter [Aristotle]
16144 Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species [Aristotle]
12359 'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Aristotle, by Wedin]
12068 Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Aristotle, by Witt]
16141 In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
16149 Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle]
13434 In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke]
16035 If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke]
16036 Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke]
12987 For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz]
12906 Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz]
16955 Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett]
16996 Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke]
17370 Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt]
17368 Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt]
17389 A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré]
17388 It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré]
17870 Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog]