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Single Idea 17389

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species ]

Full Idea

Contradicting one of the main points of essentialism, there is no reason in principle why a species should not survive the demise of its current genetic mechanisms (some other species coherence gradually taking over).

Gist of Idea

A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one

Source

John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 2)

Book Ref

Dupré,John: 'The Disorder of Things' [Harvard 1995], p.55

A Reaction

I would say that this meant that the species had a new essence, because I don't take what is essential to be the same as what is necessary. The new genetics would replace the old as the basic explanation of the species.

The 17 ideas from John Dupré

17375 Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré]
17374 The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré]
17379 Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré]
17377 All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré]
17378 Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré]
17381 Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré]
17380 Wales may count as fish [Dupré]
17382 Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré]
17389 A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré]
17388 It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré]
17384 Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré]
17387 Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré]
17386 The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré]
17385 Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré]
17383 Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré]
17390 Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré]
17376 We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré]