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Single Idea 10995

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity ]

Full Idea

The haecceitist (a neologism coined by Duns Scotus, pronounced 'hex-ee-it-ist', meaning literally 'thisness') believes that each thing has an individual essence, a set of properties which are essential to it.

Gist of Idea

A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing

Source

Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4)

Book Ref

Read,Stephen: 'Thinking About Logic' [OUP 1995], p.101

A Reaction

This seems to be a difference of opinion over whether a haecceity is a set of essential properties, or a bare particular. The key point is that it is unique to each entity.

The 42 ideas from 'Thinking About Logic'

10966 A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read]
10983 Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read]
10982 How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read]
10987 Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' [Read]
10985 We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic [Read]
10970 A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques [Read]
10984 Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square [Read]
10973 A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses [Read]
10971 A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses [Read]
10978 In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects [Read]
10988 Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate [Read]
10975 Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses [Read]
10974 Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset [Read]
10977 Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite) [Read]
10976 Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power [Read]
10986 Not all validity is captured in first-order logic [Read]
10972 The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic [Read]
10979 Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic [Read]
10980 Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity [Read]
10981 A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read]
10989 The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read]
10992 The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read]
10995 A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read]
11001 Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read]
11000 If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read]
10998 The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real [Read]
10997 Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers [Read]
11004 Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5 [Read]
10996 Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read]
11012 A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read]
11011 Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics [Read]
11007 Quantifiers are second-order predicates [Read]
11013 Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read]
11005 Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless [Read]
11014 Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read]
11018 There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers [Read]
11017 Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read]
11016 Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read]
11019 Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read]
11020 Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets [Read]
11025 Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read]
11024 Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read]