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Single Idea 13075

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity ]

Full Idea

In addition to the difference of time or of place there must always be an internal principle of distinction: although there can be many things of the same kind, it is still the case that none of them are ever exactly alike.

Gist of Idea

No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.27)

Book Ref

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'New Essays on Human Understanding', ed/tr. Remnant/Bennett [CUP 1996], p.230

A Reaction

This rests on Leibniz's unusual view that all things (even electrons) are qualitatively distinct. Personally I disagree with that, but agree with the idea. Things have time and place because they have identity, not the other way around.

The 106 ideas from 'New Essays on Human Understanding'

5056 Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz]
5057 If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz]
5055 No two things are totally identical [Leibniz]
5054 Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz]
5053 The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz]
5058 Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz]
11855 Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz]
11856 Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz]
12931 Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz]
17079 Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz]
12929 All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz]
12933 Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz]
4302 You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz]
12930 The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz]
12932 The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz]
19360 General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz]
12937 We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz]
12934 We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz]
12936 There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz]
12935 Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz]
12938 An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz]
12945 Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz]
12942 Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz]
12944 It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz]
12941 There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz]
12939 Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz]
12943 Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz]
12940 What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz]
12946 The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz]
19357 The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz]
12947 We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz]
19358 Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz]
12948 A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz]
12950 We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz]
12949 Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz]
12951 Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz]
12952 Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz]
12953 Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz]
12956 Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz]
12955 If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz]
12954 God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz]
12958 Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz]
12957 The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz]
12962 Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz]
12964 If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz]
19364 Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz]
19368 The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz]
12963 Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz]
12965 All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz]
12959 We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz]
12960 We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz]
19328 Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz]
12967 I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz]
12966 Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz]
12969 The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz]
12968 A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz]
12972 Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz]
12970 We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz]
12971 If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz]
13098 We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz]
13075 No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz]
12973 We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz]
12884 The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz]
12974 People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz]
12976 If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz]
12978 A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz]
12975 We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz]
12977 We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz]
12981 Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz]
12984 Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz]
12980 Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz]
12983 A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz]
12982 One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz]
12979 The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz]
12985 Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz]
12986 The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz]
12987 For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz]
12989 Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz]
12988 The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz]
12990 Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz]
12992 Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz]
12993 Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz]
12991 Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz]
12994 Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz]
12995 The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz]
12811 We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz]
12996 I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz]
12997 Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz]
12998 Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz]
12999 Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz]
13000 Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz]
13002 It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz]
13001 Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz]
13003 The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz]
13005 Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz]
13006 Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz]
10056 At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz]
13008 Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz]
13009 A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz]
12805 If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz]
12806 Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley]
12808 Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz]
12807 The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz]
1414 A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz]
21252 Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz]
21253 Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz]