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Full Idea
To say that an object a has a property P essentially is to say that it has P, and in all of certain worlds (all possible, all in which something identical with it exists, ...) the object identical with it has P. This is the standard de re interpretation.
Gist of Idea
De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties
Source
Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 5.4)
Book Ref
Brody,Baruch: 'Identity and Essence' [Princeton 1980], p.103
A Reaction
This view always has to be qualified by excluding trivially necessary properties, but that exclusion shows clearly that the notion of essential is more concerned with non-triviality than it is with necessity.
| 15834 | Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
| 11895 | A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
| 12141 | Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody] |
| 12130 | a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody] |
| 12132 | Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody] |
| 12135 | Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody] |
| 12138 | Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody] |
| 12137 | De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody] |
| 12140 | Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody] |
| 12139 | Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody] |
| 12142 | Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody] |
| 12143 | An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody] |
| 12144 | Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody] |