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Single Idea 13981
[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
]
Full Idea
We ordinarily find no difficulty in saying of a given thing that several people believe it and so, if they think it false, 'make the same mistake' or 'labour under the same delusion'.
Gist of Idea
Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion
Source
Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV)
Book Ref
Ryle,Gilbert: 'Collected Essays 2 1929-1968' [Routledge 2009], p.22
A Reaction
Ryle is playing devil's advocate, but this (like 13980) strikes me as quite good support for propositions. I suppose you can describe these phenomena as assent to sentences, but they might be very different sentences to express the same delusion.
Related Idea
Idea 13980
If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle]
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[propositions as features of thought]:
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13763
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Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all
[Aristotle]
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23404
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Words are for meaning, and once you have that you can forget the words
[Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
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6024
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Thought is unambiguous, and you should stick to what the speaker thinks they are saying
[Diod.Cronus, by Gellius]
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23322
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Humans have rational impressions, which are conceptual, and are true or false
[Stoic school, by Frede,M]
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9105
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Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language
[William of Ockham]
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6718
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I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought
[Berkeley]
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6435
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You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words
[Russell]
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22307
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Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact
[Russell]
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23490
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A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do
[Wittgenstein]
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13981
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Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion
[Ryle]
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13987
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We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French
[Ryle]
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9084
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Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true
[Plantinga]
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13943
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We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said
[Cartwright,R]
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13946
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To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words
[Cartwright,R]
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15154
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We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa
[Soames]
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6632
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The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief
[Lowe]
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9133
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Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences
[Sorensen]
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8484
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If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions
[Orenstein]
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22250
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There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance
[Recanati]
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16298
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We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages
[Halbach]
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