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Single Idea 21662

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions ]

Full Idea

Might there be some thought token that has a different content than any such token we can in principle have?

Gist of Idea

Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking?

Source

Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 10.3.3)

Book Ref

Hofweber,Thomas: 'Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics' [OUP 2018], p.268


A Reaction

For me the idea that a thought might exist which can never be thought is an absurdity, but people who believe in the external existence of parts of reality called 'propositions' seem committed to it. A baffling view.


The 14 ideas with the same theme [propositions as made of real objects]:

In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell]
In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine]
Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead]
If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell]
Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker]
A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker]
Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares]
Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks]
Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks]
Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber]
Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati]