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Full Idea
The movement of 'experimental philosophy' has pointed to evidence of considerable malleability of subject's 'intuitions' with regard to the standard kinds of thought experiments on which defenses of analytic claims typically rely.
Gist of Idea
Research throws doubts on the claimed intuitions which support analyticity
Source
Georges Rey (The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction [2013], 4.4)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.14
A Reaction
See Cappelen's interesting attack on the idea that philosophy relies on intuitions, and hence his attack on experimental philosophy. Our consensus on ordinary English usage hardly qualifies as somewhat vague 'intuitions'.
| 20293 | Analytic judgements can't be explained by contradiction, since that is what is assumed [Rey] |
| 20294 | 'Married' does not 'contain' its symmetry, nor 'bigger than' its transitivity [Rey] |
| 20297 | Analytic statements are undeniable (because of meaning), rather than unrevisable [Rey] |
| 20298 | The traditional a priori is justified without experience; post-Quine it became unrevisable by experience [Rey] |
| 20299 | If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical? [Rey] |
| 20300 | Externalist synonymy is there being a correct link to the same external phenomena [Rey] |
| 20301 | The meaning properties of a term are those which explain how the term is typically used [Rey] |
| 20302 | An intrinsic language faculty may fix what is meaningful (as well as grammatical) [Rey] |
| 20303 | Research throws doubts on the claimed intuitions which support analyticity [Rey] |