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Single Idea 7725

[filed under theme 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions ]

Full Idea

'It is raining or it is not raining' appears to true because of the general principle 'p or not-p', so it is analytic; but this does not fit Kant's idea of an analytic truth, because it is not obvious that it has a subject concept or a predicate concept.

Gist of Idea

'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Joan Weiner - Frege Ch.2

Book Ref

Weiner,Joan: 'Frege' [OUP 1999], p.15

A Reaction

The general progress of logic seems to be a widening out to embrace problem sentences. However, see Idea 7315 for the next problem that arises with analyticity. All this culminates in Quine's attack (e.g. Idea 1624).

Related Ideas

Idea 1624 If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]

Idea 7315 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A]

The 26 ideas from 'works'

13473 Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD]
6076 For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn]
3319 Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
9871 Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege]
16884 Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge]
3331 If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege]
16880 Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge]
5657 Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton]
3318 Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
16885 To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge]
16887 Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge]
16894 An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge]
16882 The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege]
5816 Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam]
7307 A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A]
7309 Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
7312 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A]
7725 'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner]
7316 Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A]
3307 Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
13455 Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD]
16895 The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge]
3328 Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
8689 Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend]
22317 Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege]
9179 Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett]