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Single Idea 10838

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis ]

Full Idea

We cannot in general suppose that we give a proper account of a concept by describing those circumstance in which we do, and those in which we do not, make use of the relevant word. We explain the point of the concept, what we use the word for.

Gist of Idea

To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage

Source

Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.231)

Book Ref

'The Nature of Truth', ed/tr. Lynch, Michael P. [MIT 2001], p.231

A Reaction

Well said. I am beginning to develop a campaign to make sure that analytical philosophy focuses on understanding concepts (in a full 'logos' sort of way), and doesn't just settle for logical form or definition or rules of usage.

The 28 ideas with the same theme [analysis concentrating on contents and source of concepts]:

23682 It would be absurd to be precise about the small things, but only vague about the big things [Plato]
2187 If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from [Hume]
9350 Our reason mostly analyses concepts we already have of objects [Kant]
18259 Analysis is becoming self-conscious about our concepts [Kant]
5530 Analysis of our concepts is merely a preparation for proper a priori metaphysics [Kant]
23188 Bad writers use shapeless floating splotches of concepts [Nietzsche]
8415 Never lose sight of the distinction between concept and object [Frege]
7132 Philosophers should create and fight for their concepts, not just clean and clarify them [Nietzsche]
10838 To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett]
8559 Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction [Shoemaker]
17034 Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail [Kripke]
6980 Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson]
6983 Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson]
14707 Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter]
15212 Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden]
2946 You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer]
11832 We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins]
8605 In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis]
2474 It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor]
13395 If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien]
23728 Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
11159 My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K]
9184 We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson]
14986 Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider]
14899 Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross]
17729 Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins]
23770 Reductive analysis makes a concept clearer, by giving an alternative simpler set [Williams,NE]
19259 If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya]