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Full Idea
X believes that if A, B, to the extent that he judges that A & B is nearly as likely as A, or (roughly equivalently) to the extent that he judges A & B to be more likely than A & ¬B.
Gist of Idea
X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B
Source
Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 5)
Book Ref
'A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic', ed/tr. Hughes,R.I.G. [Hackett 1993], p.38
A Reaction
This is a formal statement of her theory of conditionals.
13853 | It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington] |
13855 | A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington] |
13854 | Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington] |
13857 | Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington] |
13859 | X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington] |