more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 10990

[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals ]

Full Idea

The 'conversational defence' of the truth-functional view of conditionals is that a conditional may not be assertible in difficult cases.

Gist of Idea

Conditionals are truth-functional, but unassertable in tricky cases?

Source

report of H. Paul Grice (Presupposition and Conversational Implicature [1977]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.3

Book Ref

Read,Stephen: 'Thinking About Logic' [OUP 1995], p.69

The 6 ideas with the same theme [practical conventions for uttering conditional statements]:

14277 A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington]
10990 Conditionals are truth-functional, but unassertable in tricky cases? [Grice, by Read]
9723 Sentences with 'if' are only conditionals if they can read as A-implies-B [Enderton]
14356 We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson]
14278 Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington]
14287 Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington]