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Single Idea 14025

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths ]

Full Idea

The weaker version of Truthmaker is that 'truth supervenes on being'.

Gist of Idea

The weaker version of Truthmaker: 'truth supervenes on being'

Source

Thomas M. Crisp (Presentism [2003], 3.4)

Book Ref

'The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics', ed/tr. Loux,M /Zimmerman,D [OUP 2005], p.237

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A Reaction

[He cites Lewis 2001 and Bigelow 1988] This still leaves the difficulty of truths about non-existent things, and truths about possibilities (esp. those that are possible, but are never actualised). What being do mathematical truths supervene on?

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The 7 ideas with the same theme [truths supervene on how things actually are]:

6994	Truth supervenes on being [Jackson]

15548

Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis]

14025

The weaker version of Truthmaker: 'truth supervenes on being' [Crisp,TM]

14396

If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks]

14400

If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks]

18345

'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]

18346

'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]