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Full Idea
The thesis that 'truth supervenes on being' (with or without possible worlds) offers only a necessary condition for the truth of contingent propositions, whereas the standard truth-maker theory offers necessary and sufficient conditions.
Gist of Idea
'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths
Source
Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 09)
Book Ref
'Truth and Truth-Making', ed/tr. Lowe,E.J./Rami,A. [Acumen 2009], p.29
A Reaction
The point, I suppose, is that the change in being might be irrelevant to the proposition in question, so any old change in being will not ensure a change in the truth of the proposition. Again we ask - but what is this truth about?
Related Idea
Idea 14408 Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
| 6994 | Truth supervenes on being [Jackson] |
| 15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
| 14025 | The weaker version of Truthmaker: 'truth supervenes on being' [Crisp,TM] |
| 14396 | If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks] |
| 14400 | If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks] |
| 18345 | 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami] |
| 18346 | 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami] |