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Single Idea 10923

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties ]

Full Idea

What Aristotelian essentialism says is that you can have open sentences Fx and Gx, such that ∃x(nec Fx.Gx.¬nec Gx). For example, ∃x(nec(x>5). there are just x planets. ¬nec(there are just x planets)).

Gist of Idea

Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties

Source

Willard Quine (Three Grades of Modal Involvement [1953], p.176)

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'Ways of Paradox and other essays' [Harvard 1976], p.176

A Reaction

This is a denial of 'maximal essentialism', that all of a things properties might be essential. Quine is thus denying necessity, except under a description. He may be equivocating over the reference of 'there are just 9 planets'.

The 326 ideas from Willard Quine

19046 Empiricism improvements: words for ideas, then sentences, then systems, then no analytic, then naturalism [Quine]
19047 Bentham's contextual definitions preserved terms after their denotation became doubtful [Quine]
19048 Contextual definition shifted the emphasis from words to whole sentences [Quine]
19049 In scientific theories sentences are too brief to be independent vehicles of empirical meaning [Quine]
19050 Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences [Quine]
13010 In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine]
13829 If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine]
9001 Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine]
9002 Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine]
9003 Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine]
9004 If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic [Quine]
13681 Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider]
9005 Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine]
9006 Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine]
22153 Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]
19485 Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
19486 We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
19487 Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]
7627 You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine]
8871 We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson]
8826 If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim on Quine]
8827 Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim on Quine]
1635 Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper [Quine]
8898 Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine]
8899 Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine]
8900 In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]
10370 Causal relata are individuated by coarse spacetime regions [Quine, by Schaffer,J]
4216 Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Quine, by Lowe]
14490 You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine]
5745 Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism [Melia on Quine]
8789 Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright on Quine]
16966 Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine]
18966 Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified [Quine]
16961 In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables [Quine]
16963 Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants [Quine]
16964 Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine]
16965 All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express [Quine]
18438 Every worldly event, without exception, is a redistribution of microphysical states [Quine]
9763 For a good theory of the world, we must focus on our flabby foundational vocabulary [Quine]
9764 Inspiration and social improvement need wisdom, but not professional philosophy [Quine]
11092 A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine]
17595 To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine]
11095 We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine]
11096 Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine]
11094 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine]
11093 We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine]
11097 Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine]
11101 General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine]
11099 Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine]
11103 We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine]
11104 Concepts are language [Quine]
11102 Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine]
19045 Translation is too flimsy a notion to support theories of cultural incommensurability [Quine]
18439 Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine]
18440 Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine]
18441 No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine]
18442 You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine]
13589 Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine]
13588 A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine]
13590 Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine]
8483 Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine]
13591 Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine]
13592 Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine]
18170 The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed [Quine]
21338 I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage [Quine]
19321 We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham]
12221 'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate' [Quine]
21686 Sense-data are dubious abstractions, with none of the plausibility of tables [Quine]
21685 Empiricism says evidence rests on the senses, but that insight is derived from science [Quine]
12219 Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
10921 Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine]
10922 Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine]
10924 Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine]
10923 Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine]
13713 Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Quine, by Sider]
22430 If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine]
22432 Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine]
22431 Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements [Quine]
22433 It is important that the quantification over temporal entities is timeless [Quine]
22435 The logician's '→' does not mean the English if-then [Quine]
22436 Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language [Quine]
22438 Philosophy is largely concerned with finding the minimum that science could get by with [Quine]
22437 Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept [Quine]
22434 Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it [Quine]
8205 Explaining events just by bodies can't explain two events identical in space-time [Quine]
8207 The quest for simplicity drove scientists to posit new entities, such as molecules in gases [Quine]
8206 Necessity could be just generalisation over classes, or (maybe) quantifying over possibilia [Quine]
8208 In arithmetic, ratios, negatives, irrationals and imaginaries were created in order to generalise [Quine]
7375 Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett]
16932 Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine]
16933 Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
16934 General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine]
16935 If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine]
16936 Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine]
16937 You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine]
16938 To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine]
8486 Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine]
16939 Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
16941 Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine]
16940 Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine]
16943 Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine]
16942 It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine]
16944 Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine]
16945 We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
16947 Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine]
16948 Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
16949 Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine]
21748 More careful inductions gradually lead to the hypothetico-deductive method [Quine]
21749 Altruistic values concern other persons, and ceremonial values concern practices [Quine]
21750 Science is sympathetic to truth as correspondence, since it depends on observation [Quine]
21751 Love seems to diminish with distance from oneself [Quine]
4577 There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity [Quine]
9879 NF has no models, but just blocks the comprehension axiom, to avoid contradictions [Quine, by Dummett]
21696 Nominalism rejects both attributes and classes (where extensionalism accepts the classes) [Quine]
21697 The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand [Quine]
21698 All relations, apart from ancestrals, can be reduced to simpler logic [Quine]
8455 Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Quine, by Orenstein]
8456 Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Quine, by Orenstein]
12210 Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K on Quine]
10241 For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Quine, by Shapiro]
4064 The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Quine, by Crane]
19277 Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Quine, by Hale]
4443 Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Quine, by Armstrong]
8459 Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Quine, by Orenstein]
16261 If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine]
1619 There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett on Quine]
19159 Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Quine, by Davidson]
8856 Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Quine, by Yablo]
7698 If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine]
15402 There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible [Quine]
1617 The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy [Quine]
1609 I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have' [Quine]
1611 Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those [Quine]
1610 To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun [Quine]
1612 Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism [Quine]
1613 Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities [Quine]
1614 Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made [Quine]
1615 Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients [Quine]
1616 Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning [Quine]
1618 We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts [Quine]
8496 What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language [Quine]
8497 An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences [Quine]
8498 Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience [Quine]
18209 We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism [Quine]
12443 Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles? [Quine]
8470 Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein]
18963 Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine]
1633 Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine]
18964 Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine]
18965 We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine]
21642 If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine]
1634 Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine]
10014 Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects [Quine, by Hodes]
9012 Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences [Quine]
9011 Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence [Quine]
9007 It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine]
9008 There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine]
9010 We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine]
9009 Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth [Quine]
9019 Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times [Quine]
9018 A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time [Quine]
9014 Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine]
9017 Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine]
9013 We can eliminate 'or' from our basic theory, by paraphrasing 'p or q' as 'not(not-p and not-q)' [Quine]
9015 Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification [Quine]
9016 Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication [Quine]
9020 My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification [Quine]
9021 A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true [Quine]
10828 Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities [Quine]
10012 Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity [Quine]
10705 Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity [Quine]
9025 You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine]
9026 Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects [Quine]
9024 Excluded middle has three different definitions [Quine]
9023 If you say that a contradiction is true, you change the meaning of 'not', and so change the subject [Quine]
9028 Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages [Quine]
9027 A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true [Quine]
18967 A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine]
18968 The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine]
18969 How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs? [Quine]
18970 The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position [Quine]
9471 Intensions are creatures of darkness which should be exorcised [Quine]
9201 Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
9203 We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K]
10925 Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine]
10926 Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine]
14645 To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine]
10927 Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine]
10930 Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine]
10928 Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine]
10931 We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine]
15788 Syntax and semantics are indeterminate, and modern 'semantics' is a bogus subject [Quine, by Lycan]
9379 A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it [Quine]
10801 Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions [Quine]
18198 Mathematics is part of science; transfinite mathematics I take as mostly uninterpreted [Quine]
14296 Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
21700 Taking sentences as the unit of meaning makes useful paraphrasing possible [Quine]
21699 Russell offered a paraphrase of definite description, to avoid the commitment to objects [Quine]
21701 Knowing a word is knowing the meanings of sentences which contain it [Quine]
8461 The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes [Quine]
8462 A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental [Quine]
8463 Maths can be reduced to logic and set theory [Quine]
21717 Reducibility undermines type ramification, and is committed to the existence of functions [Quine, by Linsky,B]
21687 It seems obvious to prefer the simpler of two theories, on grounds of beauty and convenience [Quine]
21688 There are four suspicious reasons why we prefer simpler theories [Quine]
5747 "No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions [Quine, by Melia]
13387 Our conceptual scheme becomes more powerful when we posit abstract objects [Quine]
7925 There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two [Quine]
8277 I prefer 'no object without identity' to Quine's 'no entity without identity' [Lowe on Quine]
1630 We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract) [Quine]
1631 You could know the complete behavioural conditions for a foreign language, and still not know their beliefs [Quine]
1632 Translation of our remote past or language could be as problematic as alien languages [Quine]
6564 To affirm 'p and not-p' is to have mislearned 'and' or 'not' [Quine]
10242 I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately [Quine]
10243 My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine]
20296 Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey]
8998 Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine]
8999 Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine]
9000 If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine]
10064 Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave]
8993 If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic [Quine]
8994 If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry [Quine]
8995 Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute [Quine]
8996 If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine]
8997 There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry [Quine]
17738 Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine]
9204 Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine]
15090 Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker]
12188 Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge]
19492 Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine]
7317 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A]
9383 Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine]
12424 Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher]
9337 Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich]
9338 Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine]
9340 Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine]
19488 The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo]
9366 Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
14473 Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
7321 The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
8803 Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
17737 The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
9371 Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine]
10929 Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine]
1620 Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine]
1621 Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine]
1622 Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
1623 Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine]
1624 If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
1625 Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine]
1626 It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine]
1627 Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine]
1628 If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine]
1629 Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine]
8202 Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine]
8201 The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine]
8203 All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine]
21689 A barber shaves only those who do not shave themselves. So does he shave himself? [Quine]
21690 Whenever the pursuer reaches the spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved on [Quine]
21691 Antinomies contradict accepted ways of reasoning, and demand revisions [Quine]
21692 If we write it as '"this sentence is false" is false', there is no paradox [Quine]
21693 Russell's antinomy challenged the idea that any condition can produce a set [Quine]
21694 Membership conditions which involve membership and non-membership are paradoxical [Quine]
21695 The set scheme discredited by paradoxes is actually the most natural one [Quine]
19042 Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine]
19043 Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine]
13639 Quine says higher-order items are intensional, and lack a clearly defined identity relation [Quine, by Shapiro]
21557 Russell confused use and mention, and reduced classes to properties, not to language [Quine, by Lackey]
6891 Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory [Quine, by Mautner]
4630 Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Quine, by Baggini /Fosl]
3131 Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Quine, by Rey]
3988 Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett on Quine]
6310 Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available [Quine]
6311 The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge [Quine]
6312 We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai' [Quine]
6313 Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive [Quine]
6314 Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them [Quine]
6317 Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation [Quine]
6315 We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs [Quine]
12798 Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether [Quine]
16462 The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation [Quine]
8464 Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected [Quine]
8482 Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? [Quine]
12136 Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody on Quine]
8504 Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt]
15723 Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine]
15490 Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Quine, by Martin,CB]
15725 Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine]
15724 Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine]
15722 Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine]
15719 We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine]
15721 Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine]
15720 What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine]
17594 We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' [Quine]
7924 The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science [Quine]
17905 Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity [Quine]
9556 Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects [Quine]
8466 For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics [Quine, by Orenstein]
8467 Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit' [Quine, by Orenstein]
10667 A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Quine, by Hossack]
3325 For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
16021 Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan]
4712 Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [Quine, by O'Grady]
10311 No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts [Quine, by Hale]
10538 Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction [Quine, by Dummett]
10793 Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)]
13736 Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure [Schaffer,J on Quine]
3302 Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
10211 Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists [Quine, by Shapiro]
3336 Two things can never entail three things [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
8453 If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers [Quine]
3751 Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true [Quine, by Jacquette]
8479 Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein]
8534 Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Quine, by Armstrong]
10295 Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro]
3322 Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
6078 Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn]
15783 Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine]
15782 Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan]
2796 For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Quine, by Dancy,J]
8450 Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events [Quine, by Orenstein]
4713 For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations [Quine, by O'Grady]
3868 To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it [Quine, by Newton-Smith]
7330 The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Quine, by Miller,A]
17862 Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog]
7970 Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Quine, by Macdonald,C]