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Single Idea 14653

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties ]

Full Idea

Socrates has P essentially if he has P in every world, or has it in every world in which he exists, or - most plausible of all - has P in the actual world and has its complement [non-P] in no world.

Gist of Idea

X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere)

Source

Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], Intro)

Book Ref

Plantinga,Alvin: 'Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality' [OUP 2003], p.49


A Reaction

These strike me as mere necessary properties, which are not the same thing at all. Essences give rise to the other properties, but Plantinga offers nothing to do the job (and especially not 'Socrateity'!). Essences must explain, say I!


The 33 ideas with the same theme [essence consists of a set of properties]:

It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality [Aristotle]
Bodies have impermanent properties, and permanent ones which define its conceived nature [Epicurus]
Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus]
A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes]
Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Locke, by Copi]
It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties [Locke]
We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence [Locke]
The properties of a thing flow from its essence [Leibniz]
Leibniz's view (that all properties are essential) is extreme essentialism, not its denial [Leibniz, by Mackie,P]
Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya]
To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter]
Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine]
Essential properties are usually quantitatively determinate [Ellis]
An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga]
Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke]
X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson]
An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson]
We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden]
Essences are taken to be qualitative properties [Adams,RM]
Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael]
Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael]
A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G]
Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami]
Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K]
Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg]
Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages [Elder]
Essential properties are bound together, and would be lost together [Elder]