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Single Idea 18038
[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
]
Full Idea
In a formal semantics we can label two properties 't' and 'f' and suppose that some sentences have neither (or both). Such a manoeuvre shows nothing of philosophical interest. No connection has been made between 't' and 'f' and truth and falsity.
Gist of Idea
The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false
Source
Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 7.2)
Book Ref
Williamson,Timothy: 'Vagueness' [Routledge 1996], p.190
A Reaction
This is right, and means there is a huge gulf between 'formal' semantics (which could be implemented on a computer), and seriously interesting semantics about how language refers to and describes the world.
The
26 ideas
with the same theme
[general ideas about assigning meaning to symbols]:
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15788
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Syntax and semantics are indeterminate, and modern 'semantics' is a bogus subject
[Quine, by Lycan]
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16461
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We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language
[Stalnaker]
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16403
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'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts
[Stalnaker]
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12616
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English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts
[Fodor]
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2434
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Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation
[Fodor]
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12645
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Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world
[Fodor]
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12646
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Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological
[Fodor]
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7872
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Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track
[Papineau]
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13965
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Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different
[Soames]
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14618
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Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth
[Fine,K]
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14621
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Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values
[Fine,K]
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15587
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That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships
[Fine,K]
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15589
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The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic)
[Fine,K]
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15596
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The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression
[Fine,K]
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15598
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We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!)
[Fine,K]
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15600
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Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives
[Fine,K]
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15601
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Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference
[Fine,K]
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19534
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How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning?
[Williamson]
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19535
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Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate
[Williamson]
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19533
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Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references
[Williamson]
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18038
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The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false
[Williamson]
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18791
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In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations
[Mares]
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19538
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Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats')
[Dougherty/Rysiew]
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18053
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The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context
[Magidor]
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14720
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Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works
[Schroeter]
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17732
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Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action
[Jenkins]
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