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Single Idea 7869

[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics ]

Full Idea

Basing content on possible worlds that result in truth leaves no room for thoughts about genuine impossibilities, since there are not possible worlds whose actuality would make an 'impossible thought' true.

Gist of Idea

Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities

Source

David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 3.7)

Book Ref

Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.88

A Reaction

Negative existentials like 'no rabbits in this room' and 'no snakes in this room' seem to have the same truth conditions as well. I suppose the sentences must be translated into a logical form which suits the theory, with negation stuck on the end.

The 54 ideas from David Papineau

3509 Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau]
3510 Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau]
3511 Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau]
3512 If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau]
3513 How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau]
3514 Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau]
3515 Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau]
3516 The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau]
16369 There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded [Papineau, by Recanati]
13407 All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau]
13406 A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau]
13408 Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau]
13409 Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau]
13410 Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau]
12583 Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau]
7890 Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau]
7884 Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau]
7850 Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it [Papineau]
7851 Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states [Papineau]
7852 The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau]
7853 Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau]
7854 Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau]
7856 It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau]
7858 If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau]
7857 Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau]
7863 If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau]
7860 The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau]
7862 Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau]
7864 Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau]
7865 Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau]
7866 Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau]
7869 Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau]
7868 Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau]
7870 Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau]
7871 Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau]
7872 Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau]
7873 Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau]
7874 Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau]
7879 Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau]
7881 Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau]
7882 Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau]
7883 Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions [Papineau]
7885 The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau]
7886 Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau]
7887 States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau]
7888 Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau]
7889 Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau]
7891 We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau]
20974 Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces [Papineau]
20975 Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy [Papineau]
20970 Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role [Papineau]
20971 Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau]
7892 The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau]
20976 The completeness of physics cannot be proved [Papineau]