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Single Idea 18817

[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions ]

Full Idea

It is striking that our understanding of conditionals is not greatly impeded by widespread disagreement about their truth-conditions.

Gist of Idea

We understand conditionals, but disagree over their truth-conditions

Source

Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 4.2)

Book Ref

Rumfitt,Ian: 'The Boundary Stones of Thought' [OUP 2015], p.99

A Reaction

Compare 'if you dig there you might find gold' with 'if you dig there you will definitely find gold'. The second but not the first invites 'how do you know that?', implying truth. Two different ifs.

The 33 ideas with the same theme [meaning is the situation making a sentence true]:

22318 Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter]
4980 The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege]
7307 A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A]
18725 A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein]
8172 To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein]
22430 If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine]
6281 Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam]
6278 We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam]
19055 Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett]
19056 If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett]
8168 To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett]
4041 Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson]
6391 A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson]
15160 Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames]
14612 Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart]
19152 Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson]
19163 You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson]
23289 Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson]
18418 A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
2451 To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor]
3006 Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor]
15152 To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
15153 Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
6338 We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich]
7768 The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan]
18992 Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo]
4605 Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning' [Heil]
19203 A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks]
18697 A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button]
14000 'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian]
19074 Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO]
19082 Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO]
18817 We understand conditionals, but disagree over their truth-conditions [Rumfitt]