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Single Idea 18992

[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions ]

Full Idea

A sentence's meaning is to do with its truth-value in various possible scenarios, AND the factors responsible for that truth-value.

Gist of Idea

Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them

Source

Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], Intro)

Book Ref

Yablo,Stephen: 'Aboutness' [Princeton 2014], p.2


A Reaction

The thesis of his book, which I welcome. I'm increasingly struck by the way in which much modern philosophy settles for a theory being complete, when actually further explanation is possible. Exhibit A is functional explanations. Why that function?


The 14 ideas from 'Aboutness'

If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo]
Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo]
The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo]
A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo]
Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo]
y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo]
Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo]
'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo]
A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo]
Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo]
Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo]
Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo]
An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo]
A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo]