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Single Idea 4980

[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions ]

Full Idea

We are driven into accepting the truth-value of a sentence as constituting what it means (refers to). By the truth-value I understand the circumstance that it is true or false.

Gist of Idea

The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false

Source

Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892], p.34)

Book Ref

Frege,Gottlob: 'Translations from the Writings of Gottlob Frege', ed/tr. Geach,P/Black,M [Blackwell 1980], p.63

A Reaction

Sounds bizarre, but Black's translation doesn't help. The notion of what the whole sentence refers to (rather than its sense) is a very theoretical notion. 'All true sentences refer to the truth' sounds harmless enough.

The 33 ideas from 'On Sense and Reference'

8187 Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Frege, by Dummett]
14075 Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard]
18772 We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege]
10424 A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury]
10510 Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale]
18937 If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer]
9462 Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Frege, by Jacquette]
18936 Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Frege, by Sawyer]
10533 We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett]
4893 Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry]
18752 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee]
22318 Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter]
15597 Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K]
17002 Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege]
18778 Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege]
7805 Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
15155 Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames]
11126 'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence]
8164 Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett]
9817 Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett]
8171 Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett]
4954 Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege]
9180 Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett]
7304 Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
18773 People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege]
4976 The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege]
4977 In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege]
4978 The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege]
4979 We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege]
4980 The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege]
4981 The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege]
18940 It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege]
18939 In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege]