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Single Idea 3473

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction ]

Full Idea

I find at least five different senses of "reduction" in the literature - ontological (genes/DNA), property ontological (heat/mean molecular energy), theoretical (gas laws/statistics), logical/definitional (average plumber), and causal (solids/molecules).

Gist of Idea

Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes

Source

John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 5.II)

Book Ref

Searle,John R.: 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' [MIT 1999], p.113

A Reaction

A useful pointer towards some much needed clearer thought about reduction. It is necessary to cross reference this list against reductions which are either ontological or epistemological or linguistic.

The 116 ideas from John Searle

2427 Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers]
7389 A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle]
7390 If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle]
5789 I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
5787 There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
5790 A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
5786 A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
5788 The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
5792 Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
5791 Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
5794 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
5799 Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
5798 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
5796 If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
5797 The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
5795 There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
7746 We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle]
7747 How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle]
7748 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle]
7749 Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle]
7750 Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle]
3812 Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle]
3811 Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle]
3809 If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle]
3810 In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle]
3814 Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle]
3808 Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle]
3815 The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle]
3813 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle]
3816 Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle]
3818 We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle]
3817 Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle]
3825 Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle]
3826 A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle]
3827 The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle]
3828 Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle]
3822 Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle]
3823 Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle]
3821 Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle]
3820 The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle]
3824 A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle]
3829 Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle]
3830 In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle]
3832 Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle]
3831 Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle]
3833 A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle]
3834 An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle]
3835 If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle]
3836 If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle]
3839 Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle]
3837 We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle]
3838 Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle]
3840 We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle]
3841 Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle]
3806 Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle]
9317 Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
3450 Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle]
3454 Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle]
3451 Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle]
3453 Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle]
3455 Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle]
3456 Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle]
3457 Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle]
3458 Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle]
3459 You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle]
3462 We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle]
3461 Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle]
3463 We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle]
3465 Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle]
3464 There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle]
4088 Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle]
3466 Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle]
3467 Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle]
3468 I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle]
3469 Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle]
3470 Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle]
3471 Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle]
3472 Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle]
3473 Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle]
3474 If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle]
3475 Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle]
3476 Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle]
3477 If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle]
3531 Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle]
3532 Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle]
3533 Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin]
3478 Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle]
3479 The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle]
3480 We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle]
3481 Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle]
3482 Perception is a function of expectation [Searle]
3483 Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle]
3484 Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle]
3485 Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle]
3486 Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle]
3487 Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle]
3489 Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle]
3490 Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle]
3491 Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle]
3492 Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle]
3493 Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle]
3494 Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle]
3495 Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle]
3496 A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle]
3497 If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle]
3498 Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle]
3499 Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle]
3501 If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle]
3500 Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle]
3502 Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle]
3504 Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle]
3503 Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle]
3505 The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle]
3506 We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle]
3507 Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle]
3508 Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle]