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Single Idea 16933
[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
]
Full Idea
What makes Goodman's example a puzzle is the dubious scientific standing of a general notion of similarity, or of kind.
Gist of Idea
Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science
Source
Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.116)
Book Ref
Quine,Willard: 'Ontological Relativity and Other Essays' [Columbia 1969], p.116
A Reaction
Illuminating. It might be best expressed as revealing a problem with sortal terms, as employed by Geach, or by Wiggins. Grue is a bit silly, but sortals are subject to convention and culture. 'Natural' properties seem needed.
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[problem of a predicate which changes over time]:
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18749
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Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised
[Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
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17646
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Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form
[Goodman, by Putnam]
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17655
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Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely
[Goodman]
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16933
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Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science
[Quine]
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17675
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Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change
[Armstrong]
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17683
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Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal
[Armstrong]
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5485
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Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue
[Ellis]
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15887
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'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour
[Harré]
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15888
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The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science
[Harré]
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15096
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'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green
[Shoemaker]
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8556
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Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential
[Shoemaker]
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9652
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To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable
[Lewis]
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4783
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Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary
[Mautner, by PG]
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3760
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Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used
[Bernecker/Dretske]
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14989
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Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature
[Sider]
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14997
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Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things
[Sider]
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6738
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Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates
[Bird]
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6739
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Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses
[Bird]
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6799
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We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds
[Bird]
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7296
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'Grue' is not a colour
[Milsted]
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