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Single Idea 8556
[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
]
Full Idea
Grueness, as defined by Goodman, is not associated in the way greenness and blueness are with causal potentialities.
Gist of Idea
Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential
Source
Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §06)
Book Ref
Shoemaker,Sydney: 'Identity, Cause and Mind' [OUP 2003], p.219
A Reaction
Expressed rather more simply in Idea 7296. 'Grue' is a characteristic production of a predicate nominalist (i.e. Goodman), and that theory is just wrong. The account of properties must mesh with the account of induction.
Related Idea
Idea 7296
'Grue' is not a colour [Milsted]
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[problem of a predicate which changes over time]:
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18749
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Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised
[Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
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17646
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Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form
[Goodman, by Putnam]
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17655
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Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely
[Goodman]
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16933
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Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science
[Quine]
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17675
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Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change
[Armstrong]
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17683
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Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal
[Armstrong]
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5485
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Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue
[Ellis]
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15887
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'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour
[Harré]
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15888
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The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science
[Harré]
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15096
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'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green
[Shoemaker]
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8556
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Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential
[Shoemaker]
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9652
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To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable
[Lewis]
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4783
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Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary
[Mautner, by PG]
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3760
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Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used
[Bernecker/Dretske]
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14989
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Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature
[Sider]
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14997
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Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things
[Sider]
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6738
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Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates
[Bird]
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6739
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Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses
[Bird]
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6799
|
We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds
[Bird]
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7296
|
'Grue' is not a colour
[Milsted]
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