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Single Idea 15789

[filed under theme 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence ]

Full Idea

I suggest that Lewis's view in fact is just Meinong's view. ...Meinong distinguishes between 'existing' and merely 'subsisting', Lewis between 'being actual' and merely 'existing'.

Gist of Idea

Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting'

Source

comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 06

Book Ref

'The Possible and the Actual', ed/tr. Loux,Michael J. [Cornell 1979], p.288

A Reaction

Lewis attempts to make actuality purely 'indexical' in character, like distinguishing the world 'here' from the world 'elsewhere', but Lycan seems right that he is committed to more than that.

The 3 ideas from 'Possible Worlds'

15789 Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis]
15790 Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis]
15791 What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis]