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Single Idea 6572

[filed under theme 25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish ]

Full Idea

The purposes of punishment include deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation, and retribution, but they don't always sit well together. Deterrence is best served by making prisons miserable places, but this may run counter to rehabilitation.

Clarification

'Retribution' is revenge

Gist of Idea

Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments

Source

Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.2)

Book Ref

Fogelin,Robert: 'Walking the Tightrope of Reason' [OUP 2004], p.62


A Reaction

It seems to most educated people that retribution should be pushed far down the list if we are to be civilised (see Idea 1659), and yet personal revenge for a small act of aggression seems basic, normal and acceptable. We dream of rehabilitation.

Related Idea

Idea 1659 Protagoras seems to have made the huge move of separating punishment from revenge [Protagoras, by Vlastos]


The 21 ideas with the same theme [what grounds the right of the state to punish]:

Punishing a criminal for moral ignorance is the same as punishing someone for being blind [Epictetus]
Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus]
No crime and no punishment without a law [Roman law]
We execute irredeemable people, to protect ourselves, as a deterrent, and ending a bad life [Galen]
Punishment should only be for reform or deterrence [Hobbes]
Reparation and restraint are the only justifications for punishment [Locke]
Punishment should make crime a bad bargain, leading to repentance and deterrence [Locke]
Self-defence is natural, but not the punishment of superiors by inferiors [Locke]
There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz]
The death penalty is permissible, because its victims enjoyed the protection of that law [Montesquieu]
If religion teaches determinism, penalties must be severe; if free will, then that is different [Montesquieu]
We accept the death penalty to prevent assassinations, so we must submit to it if necessary [Rousseau]
A trial proves that a criminal has broken the social treaty, and is no longer a member of the state [Rousseau]
Justice asserts the death penalty for murder, from a priori laws [Kant]
Society can punish actions which it believes to be prejudicial to others [Mill]
Get rid of the idea of punishment! It is a noxious weed! [Nietzsche]
Reasons that justify punishment can also justify the crime [Nietzsche]
Execution is worse than murder, because we are using the victim, and really we are the guilty [Nietzsche]
To punish people we must ourselves be innocent - but that undermines the desire to punish [Weil]
Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments [Fogelin]
Retributivists say a crime can be 'paid for'; deterrentists still worry about potential victims [Fogelin]