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Single Idea 14940
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
]
Full Idea
There is little positive by way of implications for metaphysics that we can adduce from cutting-edge physics.
Gist of Idea
Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics
Source
J Ladyman / D Ross (Every Thing Must Go [2007], 3.7.2)
Book Ref
Ladyman,J/Ross,D: 'Every Thing Must Go' [OUP 2007], p.174
A Reaction
My personal suspicion is that this will always be the case, even though there may be huge advances in physics, and I offer that as a reason why metaphysicians do not (pace Ladyman and Ross) need to study physics. They grasp 'negative' lessons.
The
60 ideas
from 'Every Thing Must Go'
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14892
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The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14891
|
There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14898
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Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
|
14897
|
We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14899
|
Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think?
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14903
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Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
|
14900
|
In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14902
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Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14901
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Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14909
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Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical)
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14905
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The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14904
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Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14907
|
Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14908
|
Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14910
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Some science is so general that it is metaphysical
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14911
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Science is opposed to downward causation
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14912
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There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14913
|
We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14914
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Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14916
|
What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14915
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The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14918
|
The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14920
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If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14921
|
The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14922
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The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14923
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In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14924
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If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance?
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14928
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Things are abstractions from structures
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14926
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Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14925
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The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
|
14927
|
Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14931
|
That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
|
14929
|
A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
|
14930
|
Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14932
|
Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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10493
|
If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
|
14934
|
Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14936
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A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14940
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Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14937
|
That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14939
|
Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14938
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A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14942
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Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14941
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We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14943
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Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14944
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There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14945
|
The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14946
|
There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14947
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Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information
[Ladyman/Ross]
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|
14948
|
To be is to be a real pattern
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14949
|
A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14951
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We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14952
|
Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it)
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14950
|
Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
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14953
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Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14954
|
Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
|
14955
|
Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14958
|
A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14956
|
Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14957
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There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature
[Ladyman/Ross]
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