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Single Idea 6095
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
]
Full Idea
It seems to me that the business of metaphysics is to describe the world.
Gist of Idea
The business of metaphysics is to describe the world
Source
Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §III)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'Russell's Logical Atomism', ed/tr. Pears,David [Fontana 1972], p.71
A Reaction
At least he believed in metaphysics. Presumably he intends to describe the world in terms of its categories, rather than cataloguing every blade of grass.
The
32 ideas
from 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism'
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18348
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Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers
[Russell, by Rami]
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7744
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Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions
[Russell, by McCullogh]
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21708
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Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions)
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
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19051
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Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data
[Russell, by Quine]
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5465
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Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states
[Russell, by Ellis]
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18376
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Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts
[Russell, by Armstrong]
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6060
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'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true
[Russell]
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9022
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Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes
[Quine on Russell]
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21702
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In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts'
[Russell, by Quine]
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6091
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Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation
[Russell]
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6089
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Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis
[Russell]
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6090
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Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences
[Russell]
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6092
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In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object
[Russell]
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6093
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The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared
[Russell]
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6094
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An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions
[Russell]
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6095
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The business of metaphysics is to describe the world
[Russell]
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6096
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I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods
[Russell]
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6097
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The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent
[Russell]
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6098
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Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition
[Russell]
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6099
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Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions
[Russell]
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6100
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Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts
[Russell]
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6101
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Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist'
[Russell]
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6102
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You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to
[Russell]
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6119
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You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name
[Russell]
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6103
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Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical
[Russell]
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6106
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Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely
[Russell]
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6105
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Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality
[Russell]
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6104
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Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions
[Russell]
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10423
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There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name
[Russell, by Sainsbury]
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10426
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A name has got to name something or it is not a name
[Russell]
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21712
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I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday
[Russell]
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21709
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You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert
[Russell]
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