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Single Idea 1848
[filed under theme 2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
]
Full Idea
We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence.
Gist of Idea
We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence
Source
Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.10)
Book Ref
Aquinas,Thomas: 'Selected Philosophical Writings', ed/tr. McDermott,Timothy [OUP 1993], p.173
The
17 ideas
from 'Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo'
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1846
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The will can only want what it thinks is good
[Aquinas]
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1847
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The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means
[Aquinas]
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1848
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We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence
[Aquinas]
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1856
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Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable
[Aquinas]
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1857
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We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it
[Aquinas]
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1858
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The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths
[Aquinas]
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1859
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Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process
[Aquinas]
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1860
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Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge
[Aquinas]
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1861
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The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it
[Aquinas]
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1862
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However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit
[Aquinas]
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1854
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We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will
[Aquinas]
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1852
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For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many
[Aquinas]
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1853
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Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will
[Aquinas]
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1855
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If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it
[Aquinas]
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1850
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Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming
[Aquinas]
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1851
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Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind
[Aquinas]
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1849
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Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them
[Aquinas]
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