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Single Idea 3822

[filed under theme 2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason ]

Full Idea

Theoretical reason is typically a matter of accepting a conclusion or hypothesis on the basis of argument or evidence, and is thus a special case of practical reason.

Gist of Idea

Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason

Source

John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII)

Book Ref

Searle,John R.: 'Rationality in Action' [MIT 2001], p.90

The 116 ideas from John Searle

2427 Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers]
7389 A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle]
7390 If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle]
5789 I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
5787 There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
5790 A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
5786 A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
5788 The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
5792 Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
5791 Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
5794 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
5799 Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
5798 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
5796 If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
5797 The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
5795 There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
7746 We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle]
7747 How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle]
7748 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle]
7749 Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle]
7750 Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle]
3812 Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle]
3811 Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle]
3809 If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle]
3810 In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle]
3814 Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle]
3808 Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle]
3815 The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle]
3813 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle]
3816 Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle]
3818 We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle]
3817 Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle]
3825 Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle]
3826 A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle]
3827 The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle]
3828 Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle]
3822 Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle]
3823 Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle]
3821 Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle]
3820 The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle]
3824 A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle]
3829 Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle]
3830 In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle]
3832 Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle]
3831 Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle]
3833 A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle]
3834 An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle]
3835 If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle]
3836 If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle]
3839 Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle]
3837 We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle]
3838 Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle]
3840 We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle]
3841 Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle]
3806 Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle]
9317 Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
3450 Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle]
3454 Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle]
3451 Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle]
3453 Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle]
3455 Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle]
3456 Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle]
3457 Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle]
3458 Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle]
3459 You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle]
3462 We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle]
3461 Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle]
3463 We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle]
3465 Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle]
3464 There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle]
4088 Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle]
3466 Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle]
3467 Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle]
3468 I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle]
3469 Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle]
3470 Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle]
3471 Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle]
3472 Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle]
3473 Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle]
3474 If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle]
3475 Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle]
3476 Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle]
3477 If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle]
3531 Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle]
3532 Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle]
3533 Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin]
3478 Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle]
3479 The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle]
3480 We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle]
3481 Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle]
3482 Perception is a function of expectation [Searle]
3483 Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle]
3484 Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle]
3485 Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle]
3486 Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle]
3487 Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle]
3489 Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle]
3490 Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle]
3491 Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle]
3492 Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle]
3493 Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle]
3494 Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle]
3495 Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle]
3496 A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle]
3497 If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle]
3498 Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle]
3499 Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle]
3501 If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle]
3500 Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle]
3502 Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle]
3504 Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle]
3503 Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle]
3505 The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle]
3506 We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle]
3507 Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle]
3508 Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle]