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Single Idea 22244
[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
]
Full Idea
A subject's thought is about A, but, unbeknownst to the subject, B is substituted for A. Then there is Field's 'partial reference', because the subject's thought is still partially about A, even though they are following B.
Gist of Idea
'Partial reference' is when the subject thinks two objects are one object
Source
report of Hartry Field (Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference [1973]) by François Recanati - Mental Files in Flux 2
Book Ref
Recanati,François: 'Mental Files in Flux' [OUP 2016], p.30
A Reaction
Used to interpret a well-known case: Wally says of Udo 'he needs a haircut'; Zach looks at someone else and says 'he sure does'. Recanati explains it by mental files.
The
44 ideas
from Hartry Field
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9160
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Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible
[Field,H]
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9161
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Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view
[Field,H]
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9162
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Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that
[Field,H]
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9163
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If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori
[Field,H]
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9164
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We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence
[Field,H]
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9166
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People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct'
[Field,H]
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9165
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Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes
[Field,H]
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8401
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Physical laws are largely time-symmetric, so they make a poor basis for directional causation
[Field,H]
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8400
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Identifying cause and effect is not just conventional; we explain later events by earlier ones
[Field,H]
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8402
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The only reason for adding the notion of 'cause' to fundamental physics is directionality
[Field,H]
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8404
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Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected
[Field,H]
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9226
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If mathematical theories conflict, it may just be that they have different subject matter
[Field,H]
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8714
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Fictionalists say 2+2=4 is true in the way that 'Oliver Twist lived in London' is true
[Field,H]
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8959
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Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science
[Field,H, by Szabó]
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8958
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In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers
[Field,H, by Szabó]
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10261
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The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth
[Field,H, by Shapiro]
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9570
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In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things
[Field,H, by Chihara]
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10260
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Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q
[Field,H, by Shapiro]
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18212
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Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions
[Field,H]
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18215
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It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises
[Field,H]
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18214
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Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful
[Field,H]
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18213
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Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical
[Field,H]
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18216
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Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements
[Field,H]
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18218
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Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space
[Field,H]
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18220
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Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive
[Field,H]
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18219
|
Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously
[Field,H]
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18222
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Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation
[Field,H]
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18221
|
'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space
[Field,H]
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9623
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Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets
[Brown,JR on Field,H]
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18223
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In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents
[Field,H]
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9917
|
'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract
[Field,H]
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8757
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The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities
[Field,H]
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18211
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You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic
[Field,H]
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18210
|
Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions?
[Field,H]
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13499
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Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation
[Field,H, by Hart,WD]
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10818
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Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions
[Field,H]
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7615
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Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects
[Field,H, by Putnam]
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10817
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Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions
[Field,H]
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10819
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Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model
[Field,H]
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10820
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In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific
[Field,H]
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10826
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'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism
[Field,H]
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10825
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The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others
[Field,H]
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10827
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Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers
[Field,H]
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22244
|
'Partial reference' is when the subject thinks two objects are one object
[Field,H, by Recanati]
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