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Single Idea 12236

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law ]

Full Idea

Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth.

Gist of Idea

Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth

Source

David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.1)

Book Ref

Oderberg,David S.: 'Real Essentialism' [Routledge 2009], p.5


A Reaction

That is, if two things must have identical properties because they are the same thing, this is because those properties are essential to the thing. Otherwise two things could be the same, even though one of them lacked a non-identifying property.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [identical objects must have identical features or truths]:

Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes [Aristotle]
Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
Two bodies differ when (at some time) you can say something of one you can't say of the other [Hobbes]
Two substances can't be the same if they have different attributes [Spinoza]
Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman]
The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins]
Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
Leibniz's Law must be kept separate from the substitutivity principle [Noonan]
Indiscernibility is basic to our understanding of identity and distinctness [Noonan]
Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn]
Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn]
Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn]
Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg]
If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider]
If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley]