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Single Idea 6050

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law ]

Full Idea

Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity.

Gist of Idea

Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity

Source

Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1)

Book Ref

McGinn,Colin: 'Logical Properties' [OUP 2003], p.7


A Reaction

A very important observation, because it leads to recognition of the way in which basic concepts and categories of thought interconnect. Which is more metaphysically basic, identity or properties? It is not easy to say…


The 18 ideas with the same theme [identical objects must have identical features or truths]:

Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes [Aristotle]
Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
Two bodies differ when (at some time) you can say something of one you can't say of the other [Hobbes]
Two substances can't be the same if they have different attributes [Spinoza]
Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman]
The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins]
Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
Leibniz's Law must be kept separate from the substitutivity principle [Noonan]
Indiscernibility is basic to our understanding of identity and distinctness [Noonan]
Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn]
Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn]
Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn]
Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg]
If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider]
If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley]