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Single Idea 16259

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems ]

Full Idea

Naïve translation from natural language into formal language can obscure necessary ontology as easily as it can create superfluous ontological commitment. …The lion's share of metaphysical work is done when settling on the right translation.

Gist of Idea

Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology

Source

Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.1)

Book Ref

Maudlin,Tim: 'The Metaphysics within Physics' [OUP 2007], p.82


A Reaction

I suspect this is more than a mere problem of 'naivety', but may be endemic to the whole enterprise. If you hammer a square peg into a round hole, you expect to lose something. Language is subtle, logic is crude.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [troubles with theories of commitment]:

To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach]
Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B]
You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine]
If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine]
If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine]
Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine]
If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C]
Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau]
All scientific tests will verify mathematics, so it is a background, not something being tested [Sober]
Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter [Heil]
The theoretical indispensability of atoms did not at first convince scientists that they were real [Maddy]
If a successful theory confirms mathematics, presumably a failed theory disconfirms it? [Chihara]
No scientific explanation would collapse if mathematical objects were shown not to exist [Chihara]
Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology [Maudlin]
In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni]
We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni]
Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo]