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Single Idea 16261

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems ]

Full Idea

If Quine restricts himself to first-order predicate calculus, then the ontological implications concern the subjects of predicates. The nature of predicates, and what must be true for the predication, have disappeared from the radar screen.

Gist of Idea

If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication

Source

comment on Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948]) by Tim Maudlin - The Metaphysics within Physics 3.1

Book Ref

Maudlin,Tim: 'The Metaphysics within Physics' [OUP 2007], p.83


A Reaction

Quine's response, I presume, is that the predicates can all be covered extensionally (red is a list of the red objects), and so a simpler logic will do the whole job. I agree with Maudlin though.

Related Idea

Idea 16260 Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic [Maudlin]


The 17 ideas with the same theme [troubles with theories of commitment]:

To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach]
Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B]
You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine]
If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine]
If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine]
Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine]
If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C]
Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau]
All scientific tests will verify mathematics, so it is a background, not something being tested [Sober]
Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter [Heil]
The theoretical indispensability of atoms did not at first convince scientists that they were real [Maddy]
If a successful theory confirms mathematics, presumably a failed theory disconfirms it? [Chihara]
No scientific explanation would collapse if mathematical objects were shown not to exist [Chihara]
Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology [Maudlin]
In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni]
We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni]
Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo]