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Single Idea 16432

[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference ]

Full Idea

In 'causal descriptivism' the causal story is built into the description that is the content of the name (and also incorporates a rigidifying operator to ensure that the descriptions that names abbreviate have wide scope).

Gist of Idea

One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content

Source

Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 5)

Book Ref

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.211

A Reaction

Not very controversial, I would say, since virtually every fact about the world has a 'causal story' built into it. Must we insist on rigidity in order to have wide scope?

The 22 ideas with the same theme [reference fixed by a causal link to something]:

4140 The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein]
17506 I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
9181 The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett]
10516 A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale]
5822 The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke]
17033 We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke]
5823 The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
5825 Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
14080 Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
14071 Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
14215 Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
10432 A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury]
3209 Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers [Rey]
3210 If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning [Rey]
7615 Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam]
9547 Mathematical entities are causally inert, so the causal theory of reference won't work for them [Chihara]
15166 Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle]
18612 Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery]
14475 How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]
14474 Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]