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Full Idea
A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for x's being the intended referent of S's use of a name is that x should be the source of the causal origin of the body of information that S has associated with the name.
Gist of Idea
The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it
Source
Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I)
Book Ref
Evans,Gareth: 'Collected Papers' [OUP 1985], p.13
A Reaction
This is Evans's adaptation of Kripke's causal theory of names. This cries out for a counterexample. I say something about General Montgomery, having just listened to 'Monty's Double' give a talk, believing it was Montgomery?
| 9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
| 9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
| 5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
| 9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
| 9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
| 9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
| 5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
| 5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
| 9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |