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Single Idea 5823

[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference ]

Full Idea

A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for x's being the intended referent of S's use of a name is that x should be the source of the causal origin of the body of information that S has associated with the name.

Gist of Idea

The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it

Source

Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I)

Book Ref

Evans,Gareth: 'Collected Papers' [OUP 1985], p.13

A Reaction

This is Evans's adaptation of Kripke's causal theory of names. This cries out for a counterexample. I say something about General Montgomery, having just listened to 'Monty's Double' give a talk, believing it was Montgomery?

The 22 ideas with the same theme [reference fixed by a causal link to something]:

4140 The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein]
17506 I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
9181 The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett]
10516 A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale]
5822 The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke]
17033 We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke]
5823 The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
5825 Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
14080 Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
14071 Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
14215 Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
10432 A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury]
3209 Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers [Rey]
3210 If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning [Rey]
7615 Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam]
9547 Mathematical entities are causally inert, so the causal theory of reference won't work for them [Chihara]
15166 Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle]
18612 Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery]
14475 How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]
14474 Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]