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Single Idea 16388
[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
]
Full Idea
My view inherits from Frege 'modes of presentation'. Reference is not enough, and sense is needed. …We must make room for non-descriptive modes of presentation, and these are mental files.
Gist of Idea
We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that
Source
François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 18.1)
Book Ref
Recanati,François: 'Mental Files' [OUP 2012], p.243
A Reaction
[compressed] Recanati aims to avoid the standard Kripkean criticisms of descriptivism, while being able to handle Frege's puzzles. I take Recanati's mental files theory to be the most promising approach.
The
36 ideas
from 'Mental Files'
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18409
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Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features
[Recanati]
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16348
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Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties
[Recanati]
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16371
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Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names
[Recanati]
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16372
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Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense
[Recanati]
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16373
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Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one
[Recanati]
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16374
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There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link
[Recanati]
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16375
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Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object
[Recanati]
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16377
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Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content
[Recanati]
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16378
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An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person
[Recanati]
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16381
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The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers)
[Recanati]
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16380
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Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication
[Recanati]
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16384
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Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential)
[Recanati]
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16382
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Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files
[Recanati]
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16386
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Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well)
[Recanati]
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16387
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Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction
[Recanati]
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16388
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We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that
[Recanati]
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16389
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If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things
[Recanati]
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16393
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In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference
[Recanati]
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16351
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In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication
[Recanati]
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16350
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Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects
[Recanati]
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16352
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A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….'
[Recanati]
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16354
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Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things
[Recanati]
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16353
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Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations
[Recanati]
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16355
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Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals
[Recanati]
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16356
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There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct
[Recanati]
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16357
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Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms
[Recanati]
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16358
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The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains
[Recanati]
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16359
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Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses
[Recanati]
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16360
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Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files
[Recanati]
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16361
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A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object
[Recanati]
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16364
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Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do
[Recanati]
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16363
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Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction
[Recanati]
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16365
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Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents)
[Recanati]
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16367
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There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files
[Recanati]
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16368
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Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic
[Recanati]
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16370
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A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files
[Recanati]
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