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Single Idea 12647
[filed under theme 18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
]
Full Idea
Mental representations can serve both as names for things in the world and as names of files in the memory.
Gist of Idea
Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3 App)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'LOT 2: the Language of Thought Revisited' [OUP 2008], p.94
A Reaction
I am laughed at for liking this idea (given the present files of ideas before you), but I think this it is very powerful. Chicken before egg. I was drawn to databases precisely because they seemed to map how the mind worked.
The
41 ideas
from 'LOT 2'
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12628
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Knowing that must come before knowing how
[Fodor]
|
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12625
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Pragmatism is the worst idea ever
[Fodor]
|
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12624
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Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role
[Fodor]
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12630
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If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff
[Fodor]
|
|
12629
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For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference
[Fodor]
|
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12627
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Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success
[Fodor]
|
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12626
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Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession
[Fodor]
|
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12632
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In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role
[Fodor]
|
|
12633
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Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension
[Fodor]
|
|
12634
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'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference
[Fodor]
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12635
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Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept
[Fodor]
|
|
12636
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Mental states have causal powers
[Fodor]
|
|
12651
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Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone'
[Fodor]
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12649
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We think in file names
[Fodor]
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12648
|
Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind
[Fodor]
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12650
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'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file
[Fodor]
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12652
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Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter
[Fodor]
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12647
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Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory
[Fodor]
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12637
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Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference
[Fodor]
|
|
12638
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If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers
[Fodor]
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12639
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Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes
[Fodor]
|
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12642
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Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers
[Fodor]
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12640
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Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth
[Fodor]
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|
12641
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Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts
[Fodor]
|
|
12644
|
Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy
[Fodor]
|
|
12643
|
Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English
[Fodor]
|
|
12645
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Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world
[Fodor]
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12646
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Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological
[Fodor]
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|
12653
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There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility
[Fodor]
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12654
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You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog'
[Fodor]
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|
12655
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Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them?
[Fodor]
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12656
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P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that
[Fodor]
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|
12657
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Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared
[Fodor]
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12661
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The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another
[Fodor]
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|
12658
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Nobody knows how concepts are acquired
[Fodor]
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12662
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We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype
[Fodor]
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|
12659
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Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product)
[Fodor]
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12660
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One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts
[Fodor]
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12664
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A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and'
[Fodor]
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|
12663
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We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates
[Fodor]
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|
12631
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Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic
[Fodor]
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