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Single Idea 18471

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding ]

Full Idea

The concept of 'grounding' appears to cry out for treatment as a family resemblance concept, a concept whose instances have no more in common than different games do.

Gist of Idea

Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation

Source

Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 1.6)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.10

A Reaction

I like the word 'determinations', though MacBride's point my also apply to that. I take causation to be one species of determination, and truth-making to be another. They form a real family, with no adoptees.

The 25 ideas from Fraser MacBride

21352 'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata [MacBride]
21353 Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters [MacBride]
21354 It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it [MacBride]
8923 Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function [MacBride]
8926 For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first [MacBride]
18466 If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride]
18471 Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride]
18472 Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride]
18473 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride]
18474 Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
18475 Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride]
18476 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride]
18478 Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride]
18479 There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride]
18477 There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride]
18480 Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride]
18482 Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride]
18481 Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride]
18483 The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
18484 Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride]
18485 Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
18486 We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride]
18490 Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
18489 Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride]
18493 Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]