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Single Idea 16694

[filed under theme 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things ]

Full Idea

The standard scholastic examples of 'entia successiva' are time and motion.

Gist of Idea

Typical successive things are time and motion

Source

Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 18.1)

Book Ref

Pasnau,Robert: 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671' [OUP 2011], p.378

A Reaction

Aristotle's examples of a day and the Games seem clearer, as time and motion do not count so clearly as 'things'.

The 53 ideas from 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671'

16580 A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change [Pasnau]
16579 There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates [Pasnau]
16584 If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure [Pasnau]
16583 Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure [Pasnau]
16581 Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing [Pasnau]
16586 The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle [Pasnau]
16592 Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it [Pasnau]
16596 A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do [Pasnau]
16598 Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics [Pasnau]
16602 Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau]
16603 In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science [Pasnau]
16606 Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers [Pasnau]
16604 Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus [Pasnau]
16605 After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known [Pasnau]
16607 Renaissance Platonism is peripheral [Pasnau]
16609 Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic [Pasnau]
16610 Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes [Pasnau]
16615 Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones [Pasnau]
16612 Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance [Pasnau]
16613 Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory [Pasnau]
16617 Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist [Pasnau]
16628 Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance [Pasnau]
16568 Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle [Pasnau]
16642 Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance [Pasnau]
16649 Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable' [Pasnau]
16653 Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology [Pasnau]
16662 The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau]
16671 Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way [Pasnau]
16677 Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau]
16680 Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation [Pasnau]
16694 Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau]
16704 In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years [Pasnau]
16715 Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy [Pasnau]
16722 Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau]
16727 In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form [Pasnau]
16732 17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau]
16733 17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau]
16738 Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau]
16741 Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics [Pasnau]
16747 Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle [Pasnau]
16748 Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms [Pasnau]
16749 Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau]
16750 If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances? [Pasnau]
16759 Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause [Pasnau]
16760 Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau]
16767 There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau]
16769 If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident [Pasnau]
16777 If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties [Pasnau]
16775 For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau]
16781 The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck [Pasnau]
16783 Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents [Pasnau]
16785 If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult [Pasnau]
16788 Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau]