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Single Idea 13921

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory ]

Full Idea

Things must have an essence, in the sense of 'what it is to be the individual of that kind', or it would make no sense to say we can talk or think comprehendingly about things at all. If we don't know what it is, how can we think about it?

Gist of Idea

All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them

Source

E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 2)

Book Ref

'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.35

A Reaction

Lowe presents this as a sort of Master Argument for essences. I think he is working with the wrong notion of essence. All he means is that things must have identities to be objects of thought. Why equate identity with essence, and waste a good concept?

The 21 ideas with the same theme [essence is what intrinsically explains a thing]:

12361 Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
11244 Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Aristotle, by Politis]
16972 The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
5084 A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability [Aristotle]
11994 Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung]
17184 All natures of things produce some effect [Spinoza]
16787 Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Locke, by Pasnau]
5057 If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz]
10937 Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami]
11992 Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung]
12144 Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody]
11871 Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins]
17564 The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen]
12089 Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt]
17390 Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré]
10935 An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
16542 Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe]
13921 All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe]
12247 Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg]
15181 Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle]
11906 The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]